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ABSTRACT
With the explosive growth of e-commerce and the booming
of e-payment, detecting online transaction fraud in real time
has become increasingly important to Fintech business. To
tackle this problem, we introduce the TitAnt, a transaction
fraud detection system deployed in Ant Financial, one of the
largest Fintech companies in the world. The system is able
to predict online real-time transaction fraud in mere millisec-
onds. We present the problem definition, feature extraction,
detection methods, implementation and deployment of the
system, as well as empirical effectiveness. Extensive experi-
ments have been conducted on large real-world transaction
data to show the effectiveness and the efficiency of the pro-
posed system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fraud, such as phone fraud, insurance fraud and credit
card fraud, causes severe problems for government and busi-
ness. However, detecting such a fraud has always been chal-
lenging. With the rapid development of the e-commerce
and e-payment, the problem of online transaction fraud has
become increasingly prominent. Compared with traditional
areas, online transaction is facing a considerably larger vol-
ume of fund transfer.
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According to the statistics [41], in the year of 2017, the
number and the volume of online transaction reaches 48 bil-
lion and 2, 075 trillion yuan respectively only in China. Ant
Financial1, also known as Alipay, accounts for about 58% of
China’s third-part online payment transactions [30]. Specif-
ically, on 2017’s Double Eleven Shopping Festival2 (similar
to Black Friday Day in the US), a single day’s transaction
shot up to US$25 billion [51, 25]. With such transaction
volume, it becomes thus of great significance to detect and
prevent online transaction fraud.
To collect and analyze such a magnitude of transaction
data, it requires a robust database component for offline
storage and management. Furthermore, a large-scale dis-
tributed computing component for running algorithms is
also necessary. To satisfy the low latency requirements for
online serving, online prediction with efficient data accessing
is of great significance. Meanwhile, feature extraction and
detection methods are equally important.
Rule-based methods have been extensively studied over
the years [46] for fraud detection problem. However, fraud
patterns change rapidly over time, greatly deteriorating the
effectiveness of rules summarized by expert experience. Sub-
sequently, many data mining based methods have been in-
vestigated. For example, supervised learning methods, are
proposed recently [40, 53]. However, transaction data usu-
ally exhibit two kinds of characteristics: 1) the labels are
unbalanced, i.e., the majority of transactions are not fraudu-
lent but normal, and 2) compared with analyzing individual
transaction records, aggregated data often provides much
richer information to identify fraud patterns.
To cope with the first characteristic, several unsupervised
learning and anomaly detection methods are introduced [10,
35], however label information can hardly be utilized. On
the other hand, some existing data aggregation strategies are
also applied for detecting fraud [65, 28], nevertheless, most
of the previous approaches can hardly capture the complex
fraud patterns of the online transactions. It is this paper’s
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ant Financial
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singles%27 Day
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topic to investigate how to deal with these two characteris-
tics with our methods.
In this paper, we present a real-world task in FinTech and
introduce our TitAnt3 system, which is actively detecting
fraudulent transactions. Our contributions are summarized
as follows:
• We carefully analyze the task and some discoveries are
excavated. Based on our observations, new feature
extraction approaches for transaction fraud detection
are examined, which is capable of making full use of
the information from aggregated data.
• We design and develop a real-world transaction fraud
detection system which is able to train offline large-
scale data in hours, and predict online real-time trans-
action fraud within only milliseconds.
• We conduct extensive experiments on a large trans-
action record dataset to validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our system, including rule-based methods,
anomaly detection approaches and classification mod-
els.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses re-
lated work of fraud detection. Section 3 presents the prob-
lem definition, feature extraction and detection methods.
Section 4 describes the details of the implementation and
deployment of our TitAnt system. Section 5 shows experi-
mental results, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we investigate the related literature, in-
cluding expert systems and rule-based approaches, super-
vised and unsupervised learning algorithms for fraud detec-
tion task, as well as recently proposed network representa-
tion learning models.
2.1 Rule-based Methods and Expert System
Quinlan [48] and Cohen [13] introduce assertion statement
of IF {conditions} and THEN {a consequent} to recognize
fraud records at first. By distinguishing fraudulent and nor-
mal records, Brause et al. [7] generalizes and weighs the
association rules of detecting credit card fraud. Based on
previous achievement, Baulier et al. [4] identifies implicit
fraudulent calls by generating decision variables, Rosset et
al. [52] investigates a two-stage rule-based solution to detect
telephone fraud, and Wheeler and Aitken [64] adopt case-
based reasoning to analyze the hardest ones of misclassified
cases. Expert system based methods, on the other hand,
also have been well investigated. Major and Riedinger [38]
uses statistical knowledge to construct a five-layer system,
Von Altrock [61], Stefano and Gisella [54], Pathak et al.
[42] respectively design different fuzzy expert systems for a
specific scene. Besides, Chiu and Tsai [12] proposes FPM
algorithm to mine frequent patterns of credit card trans-
actions. With the rapid evolution of fraud patterns, only
hand-summarized rules or expert knowledge are not suffi-
cient to satisfy today’s online detection, the methods [47,
33] learning knowledgeable information from historical data
is more worthwhile to investigate.
3It indicates the combination of Titan and Ant, where the
Titans are giant deities with incredible strength in Greek
mythology and the Ant is the name of the company by the
meaning of “greatness comes from micro things”.
2.2 Supervised Learning Models
Hand [27] first uses a linear discriminative model to de-
tect fraud, and later Foster and Stine [18] propose an im-
proved least square regression with stepwise selection pre-
dicting. Bayesian approaches have been investigated, where
Ezawa and Norton [17] employ a four-stage Bayesian net-
work model for telephone fraud and Viaene et al. [60] adopts
AdaBoosted naive Bayes for insurance fraud. Otherwise,
neural network based models are applied in fraud diagnosis
[21, 43, 2]. Subsequently, Syeda et al. [55] develops a par-
allel system of fuzzy neural networks, Barse et al. [3] lever-
ages the memory-based neural network to capture temporal
dependencies, and Maes et al. [37] combines Bayesian net-
works and neural networks for detecting credit card fraud.
Also, Bhowmik [5] applies Bayesian classification and deci-
sion trees in insurance fraud detection task. Besides, Kim et
al. [31] and Wang and Ma [63] utilize SVM-based ensemble
strategy for detecting telecommunication subscription fraud
and credit fraud. Besides, Halvaiee and Akbari [26] and
Jia-jie [29] respectively investigate the effectiveness of the
artificial immune system and particle swarm optimization
algorithm in fraud detection.
2.3 Unsupervised Learning and Aggregation
Strategies
Cox et al. [15] visualizes data with the information of
color, position, size and etc. to help to detect fraud. Bolton
et al. [6] introduces profiling method to detect credit card
fraud, Burge and Shawe-Taylor [8] uses a recurrent neural
network to exploit temporal information of account behav-
ior, and Cortes et al. [14] explores graph mining algorithms
such as link analysis. Later, Yamanishi et al. [66] detects
the fraud from medical insurance data by recognizing statis-
tical outliers. Aggregated data analysis is also investigated,
in which Perlich and Provost [44] propose a novel target-
dependent aggregation method, Casas et al. [10] utilizes k-
means to classify network security data, and Vadoodparast
et al. [59] combines the results of several different clustering
methods. In addition, Jha et al. [28] and Whitrow et al.
[65] detect credit card fraud employing transaction aggrega-
tion. Anomaly detection methods, such as isolation forest
[35], sheds light on fraud detection tasks, since fraudulent
transactions are undoubtedly regarded as abnormal cases.
2.4 Network Representation Learning Models
Recently, network representation learning, also known as
graph embeddings, plays an increasingly important role in
network analysis. Perozzi et al. proposes DeepWalk [45],
which is superior to traditional graph analysis approaches
like Spectral Clustering [58], Modularity [57], and wvRN
[36]. After that, many models are introduced, for exam-
ple, LINE [56], GraRep [9], node2vec [24] and etc. Besides,
Structure2Vec [16] is a state-of-the-art supervised fashion of
generating embeddings. Although these models have been
demonstrated to be effective on the public dataset, there
does not exist a distributed version that is able to support
real-world industrial-scale transaction records.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION, FEATURE EX-
TRACTION AND DETECTION METH-
ODS
(a) Basic features are extracted from user profile, transfer environment and etc.
(b) User node embeddings are learned from historical transaction records.
Figure 1: An illustrated example of basic features extraction and user node embeddings generation.
Figure 2: A simple case of aggregated data over the
transaction network.
In this section, based on our analysis of the problem, fea-
ture extraction and detection methods are introduced.
3.1 Problem Definition
In general, online transaction fraud can be categorized
into two different types: explicit and implicit. In an explicit
case, a user is aware of the fraud afterwards. After a trans-
action is completed, the user could file a fraud report and
upload the supporting proofs. Based on the transaction de-
tails, profiles and evidence, the authenticity of transaction
fraud will be examined. If this user indeed suffers from a
fraud, the fraudsters would be punished with punitive mea-
sures, such as action restrictions or account lockout, but it
would be difficult to recover the losses according to the laws.
This type is defined as an explicit fraud after an accident.
In an implicit case, what we are concerned is to take
proactive actions to prevent the potential event of fraudulent
transactions, i.e., actively detecting online transaction fraud
and taking immediate steps to prevent suspicious transac-
tions. Contrary to explicit fraud, implicit one reveals less
information and requires real-time prediction of the system.
In this paper, we aim to tackle the implicit online real-time
transaction fraud detection task and a formal problem defi-
nition is described as follows:
Definition 1. (Online Real-time Transaction Fraud De-
tection) Given historical transaction records with fraud la-
bels, the task of online real-time transaction fraud detection
is to design a system to predict whether an online real-time
transaction is a fraud or not.
3.2 Feature Extraction from Aggregated Data
In order to discover transaction fraud, user profile and
transfer contextual information are often of great impor-
tance. In particular, the fraudulent rates in some specific
locations are always higher than other areas. Figure 1 (a)
illustrates the basic user profile features extracted, such as
age, gender, and transfer city (trans city)4.
In addition, aggregated information on transaction records
can provide much richer information. Based on our investi-
gation, approximately 70% of the fraudsters have fraudulent
behaviors more than once. It suggests that fraudsters tend
to repeat their deceitful actions once successful. In Figure
2, we give a simple example to demonstrate the value of
aggregated data. A directed edge reflects the transfer rela-
tionship from the corresponding transferor to the transferee.
Directed red lines with a dollar sign indicate the fraudulent
transactions, while a black user node stands for the fraud-
ster. The on-going transaction, i.e., the dashed line with
a question mark, is very likely to be a potentially implicit
fraud. Such gathering behaviors are often observed in the
real cases and manifest in more complex ways.
To extract useful information from the aggregated trans-
action data, a transaction network is leveraged. Formally,
we define the transaction network as follows:
4trans city can be inferred from transfer IP address.
Figure 3: The architecture of TitAnt system.
Definition 2. (Transaction Network) A transaction net-
work is defined as G = (V,E). V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a
collection of nodes with each node v indicating a user while
E = {ei,j} is a set of edges with each edge e indicating the
transfer relationship from a transferor to a transferee, both
regarded as user nodes.
Based on historical records in a period of time, transac-
tion network is built for analysis. Recall the simple case in
Figure 2, all the victims including the potential one have a
same neighbor, i.e., the fraudster. It suggests they are 2-hop
neighbors to each other. Therefore, the analysis of topologi-
cal relationship is worthy of well studying in the transaction
network. To capture topological relationship information,
Network Representation Learning (NRL) is a promising di-
rection to be explored [67]. Given a transaction network,
NRL methods aim to learn a low dimensional representation
matrix D ∈ R|V |×d, whose i-th row Di is a d-dimensional
vector representing the node vi in the transaction network.
In this way, the topological information can be captured by
dense vectors, i.e., node embedding. Figure 1 (b) shows the
procedures of generating user node embeddings. First, his-
torical transaction records are collected to construct trans-
action network, and then user node embeddings are learned
by NRL methods.
As most NRL implementations in the literature are lim-
ited to a single machine, we need to reimplement in a dis-
tributed learning framework, since huge amount of transac-
tion records are being produced every day. Based on the
insights that no one NRL method is the best in all cases
[22], we select DeepWalk (DW) [45] for its efficiency, effec-
tiveness and simplicity.
Original DW utilizes random walk to generate short node
sequences which transforms the topological information from
the network into the sequences. Intuitively, the neighbors of
one node will often occur in its contextual position in the
linear node sequences. After the linear node sequences are
generated, Skip-gram with negative sampling in word2vec
[39] is applied to generate user node embeddings finally.
We also reimplement Structure2Vec (S2V) [16] as an al-
ternative. Such supervised method can take full advantages
of label information, but the learned user node embeddings
are also affected by unbalanced labels. Meanwhile, unsuper-
vised methods like DW do not require any labels, therefore,
the topological information is extracted only from transac-
tion network without being influenced by the imbalance of
labels.
3.3 Detection Methods
As the problem of fraud detection is vital to a Fintech
business, efforts have been spent for years, where about fifty
features are carefully engineered. We call such features as
basic features, which are also treated as rules or attributes.
For each user, we generate user node embeddings, i.e., ag-
gregated features, as additional information from the aggre-
gated transaction records. Basic features and aggregated
features are then concatenated together. Labels are col-
lected from user fraud reports, thus cannot be obtained in
real-time.
In order to precisely find out fraud, we extensively inves-
tigate and validate rule-based methods, anomaly detection
approaches and classification models.
Rule-based methods are widely used in many fraud de-
tection applications. Iterative Dichotomiser 3 (ID 3) [47]
is a traditional approach based on decision tree learning,
whereas C5.0 [33, 50] is revised version of C4.5 [49] to ex-
tract informative patterns from data with higher accuracy.
In those methods, features are regards as rules and label
information is utilized to do fine-tune.
Isolation Forest (IF) [35] is a classical anomaly detection
Figure 4: The architecture of MaxCompute.
approach widely used due to its effectiveness. We treat fea-
tures as attributes and directly predict fraudulent transac-
tions, since it does not require any label information. In-
tuitively, transaction fraud detection is similar to anomaly
detection tasks, since the goal is to find out abnormal trans-
actions, i.e., outliers that are more likely to be separated
from most of the other data.
One of the most popular classification models is Logistic
Regression (LR) [62]. Although continuous features can be
used in LR, better performance can be achieved after feature
discretization in most cases. Compared with LR, non-linear
models such as, Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT)
[19, 20, 1] is able to achieve better performance in a vari-
ety of industrial tasks. GBDT is a tree-based classification
model, whose decision trees learn the decision boundary of
the classification dataset, and gradient boosting combines
several weak classifiers into a stronger one.
We will examine the effectiveness of the above detection
methods in Section 5.
4. TITANT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
AND DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we show the details of the implementation
and deployment of our TitAnt system.
4.1 The Framework of TitAnt System
To guarantee timely response on fraud detection requests,
low latency predictor, robust database storage platform, and
distributed algorithms ought to be carefully designed. As
illustrated in Figure 3, our system mainly has two parts, i.e.,
offline periodical training and online real-time prediction. In
the offline training part, where models are trained on a fixed
time basis, and model files are uploaded to online predictor
for real-time transaction monitoring.
Once users initiate transaction requests in Alipay5, trans-
action logs will be periodically sent to MaxCompute6 for of-
5https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/alipay-simplify-your-
life/id333206289?mt=8
6https://www.alibabacloud.com/product/maxcompute
fline computation. MaxCompute supports SQL and MapRe-
duce for extracting basic features/labels and constructing
transaction network. At the same time, KunPeng supports
large-scale distributed NRL and classification model train-
ing7. The learned user node embeddings and classification
models are stored in MaxCompute.
Online prediction happens at Model Server (MS), where
the model files are periodically updated. Once a transaction
created by a user in Alipay APP, Alipay server immediately
requests the Model server (MS). MS then gets the related
data from Ali-HBase and makes real-time prediction. If the
transaction is detected as fraud, the on-going transaction
will be interrupted and transferor will be notified. More
details on each component will be elaborated in the following
subsections.
4.2 MaxCompute
MaxCompute, formerly known as Open Data Process-
ing Service (ODPS), is a database storage and management
platform. It has three logical layers: client layer, server layer
and storage & compute layer. As illustrated in Figure 4, de-
velopers can login with their cloud account and submit jobs
by web console in client layer, where HTTP server receives
the command and send message to next layer. Server layer
contains workers, executors and scheduler to split jobs into
subjobs for distribution. Also, heterogeneous jobs, such as
mapreduce, SQL and etc., can be recognized and operated
in the storage & compute layer based on Pangu and Fuxi,
where Pangu is a disk storage module and Fuxi is a resource
scheduling module [68].
When a SQL command is submitted by web console, the
message is sent to the HTTP server, which requires the ver-
ification of cloud account information. If authentication
passes, the job will be delivered to worker and the corre-
sponding job instance will be sent to the scheduler. After
that, scheduler registers the instance in Open Table Service
7Only classification based detection methods are reimple-
mented in KunPeng for better performance, as reimplemen-
tation is time-consuming. Rule-based and anomaly detec-
tion methods are not distributed.
Figure 5: The architecture of the MS and its interactions with other components.
(OTS) via SQL planner and its status is set as “running” si-
multaneously. OTS maintains the status of all the instances.
Finally, scheduler adds the instance into the queue and cor-
responding instance ID will be generated.
Subsequently, the scheduler will split the task of job in-
stance into multiple subtasks, which are arranged into task
pool in priority order. After that, scheduler keeps waiting
for the available resource for computing. As soon as the
resource conditions are satisfied, the subtasks are sent to
an executor, which requests Fuxi to trigger computing re-
sources in the compute layer. When all the subtasks are
finished, the executor updates the status of the instance as
“terminated” in OTS. Finally, the results will be stored in
Pangu.
4.3 KunPeng
Figure 6: The system architecture of KunPeng.
As numerous transaction records wait for analysis every
day, a distributed computing platform is an urgent need.
Traditional frameworks, such as MPI [23], do not support
good failure tolerance. However, Parameter Server (PS) [34]
supports a single point of failure, i.e., the failed instance can
be restarted and recovered to the previous status automat-
ically while other instances remain not affected. KunPeng
system [69] is self-developed by the company based on PS
framework , where various machine learning algorithms are
running simultaneously.
KunPeng supports data parallelism and model parallelism.
As illustrated in Figure 6, it consists of server nodes and
worker nodes, where server nodes store the model param-
eters while worker nodes are responsible for training. Pull
and Push operations are defined between server and worker
nodes for data exchange. Besides, communication also hap-
pens among server nodes.
Based on KunPeng, we redesign NLR and classification
algorithms, such as DW, S2V, LR, and GBDT. As an im-
portant part of DW, our reimplemented word2vec is involved
in both worker and server nodes. Worker nodes receive the
node sequences by Random walk algorithm. For every iter-
ation, each worker first read a batch of sequence data and
generate negative word list. The embeddings are then pulled
from server nodes and are updated by gradient descent. Sub-
sequently, the updated embeddings are uploaded to server
nodes. On the other hand, server nodes are responsible for
communication with workers in order to exchange embed-
ding data. Server nodes first randomly initialize the em-
beddings and wait for the push requests from worker nodes.
Once the push request is received, the corresponding embed-
dings are sent. After the update of each worker, server nodes
pull the new embeddings and aggregate them by executing
the model average operation.
4.4 MS and Ali-HBase
Figure 7: The architecture of Ali-HBase.
Once offline training section ends, online real-time pre-
diction works. Figure 5 shows an illustrative example of the
whole real-time prediction process. When a user transfer
money in Alipay App, the transfer request is sent to the
Alipay server, followed by the MS for fraud monitoring. MS
will access data from Ali-HBase for the latest version of user
node embeddings and basic features. MS are distributed
to satisfy low latency and high service load. As shown in
Figure 5, the transaction TID=2 is probably a fraud with
predicted fraud probability of 99%, thus MS sends an alert
to the Alipay server, which will further interrupt the corre-
sponding on-going transaction.
Figure 8: A graphical illustration of the datasets.
Ali-HBase is based on HBase Project8. HBase is first
proposed as Bigtable [11], a distributed, scalable and big
data store, which is suitable for our real-time data accessing
scenario. The inner data is organized in the form of Column
Family (CF), where qualifier is used as a marker. As shown
in Figure 7, the first CF is basic features where age, gender,
and trans city are qualifiers. And the second is user node
embeddings, where each dimension of value is the qualifier.
In Figure 7, users like Zoe, Sam and Liam are row-keys, to
index the corresponding data. Every time offline training is
completed, the data is uploaded to Ali-HBase by the version
of date time.
4.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implementation design, de-
ployment issues and the construction of transaction network.
First, the system has strict serving requirements, i.e., tens
of milliseconds at most for online detection including compu-
tation and communication costs. However, labels are usually
delayed, as they are collected through user feedbacks, where
online training is impractical. Thus, we adopt periodical
offline training and real-time prediction in our system.
Second, in our system, we only demonstrated the use-
fulness of user node embeddings learned from transaction
network. One may ask what about other aggregated infor-
mation, such as device and IP information? It is an inter-
esting question to construct a heterogeneous network. We
will explore this direction in future work.
5. EXPERIMENTS
To empirically quantify the benefits of each component of
our TitAnt system, we conduct experiments under different
configurations.
5.1 Experimental Setup
On this task, we adopt “T+1” mode to update the model,
which means a model will be trained and deployed in an of-
fline manner on a daily basis and will be used for prediction
for the next day on a real-time basis. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of our system, we have conducted several ex-
periments and reported the performance of each day over a
continuous week. In total, we have seven sets of data, where
each one is sliced into three subsets: one for learning user
node embeddings, another for training the classifier, and the
last for testing. Specifically, we collect 90 days of transac-
tion records to build the transaction network. The next 14
8https://hbase.apache.org/
days of labeled records are treated as the training set and
the last day of labeled records are used for the test set.
For example in Dataset 1 (illustrated in Figure 8), trans-
action records of April 10, 2017 are chosen as the test set, 14
days’ records prior to the test set are used as the training,
and the earlier 90 days of records are employed to build the
transaction network. Different from other industrial scenes,
such as e-commerce recommendation, online testing is hard
to achieve since labels are not real-time obtained.
In our experiment, one of the goals is to investigate the
effectiveness of basic features and the learned user node em-
beddings based on transaction network. More specifically,
we compare both unsupervised DW and supervised S2V
models on our task with unbalanced labels. For a fair com-
parison, the size of the learned embeddings is set to 32 and
is concatenated with the basic features. In addition, for de-
tection methods, we test the validity of rule-based ID3 and
C5.0, anomaly detection based IF and classification based
LR and GBDT.
For DW, we set the length of the random walk as 50, where
each node is sampled as the first node of the sequences 100
times, i.e., the number of sampling is 100. It takes around
1.5 hours to learn the embeddings with approximate 8 mil-
lion randomly selected transaction records with 20 machines
equipped with 10 threads in our production environment.
Aside from the transaction network, we also feed S2V with
the fraud ground truth as the edge labels. Besides, there are
a total of 52 basic features carefully extracted.
We set 100 trees for IF and raw basic features are fed
as attributes. As rule-based ID3 and C5.0 cannot support
continuous values well, we discretize the data into different
bins [32]. We impose L1 regularization and assign its weight
as 0.1 for LR, and set 300 iterations as the stopping criteria.
For GBDT, we generate 400 trees with the depth of 3 to
ensemble the results and use root mean square error as the
objective. The subsampling rate of samples and features are
set as 0.4 to prevent overfitting.
5.2 Empirical Results on Transaction Fraud
Detection
In this section, we empirically evaluate the effectiveness
of our proposed system for the transaction fraud detection
task. Eleven configurations are tested in Table 1 from April
10 to April 16, where F1 score is chosen as the evaluation
metric. The best results are written in bold font for each
day.
First, we analyze the effectiveness of the learned user node
embeddings. With the same classifier, it is obvious that in-
Table 1: Performance under different eleven configurations.
Number F1 Score April 10 April 11 April 12 April 13 April 14 April 15 April 16
1 Basic Features/Attributes+IF 10.30% 10.38% 11.62% 11.21% 10.82% 11.00% 13.30%
2 Basic Features/Rules+ID3 42.08% 44.72% 41.21% 44.25% 42.33% 41.94% 47.69%
3 Basic Features/Rules+C5.0 44.56% 51.55% 45.94% 51.17% 50.23% 51.91% 57.07%
4 Basic Features+LR 53.08% 58.47% 55.72% 60.13% 56.87% 52.52% 64.38%
5 Basic Features+GBDT 56.80% 65.47% 59.05% 64.87% 59.19% 60.34% 68.85%
6 Basic Features+S2V+LR 55.21% 62.08% 60.78% 64.11% 61.04% 55.83% 68.86%
7 Basic Features+S2V+GBDT 60.23% 66.37% 63.24% 68.87% 64.79% 63.30% 71.10%
8 Basic Features+DW+LR 56.06% 61.15% 58.37% 61.13% 60.08% 56.00% 67.33%
9 Basic Features+DW+GBDT 61.43% 66.87% 64.11% 69.93% 65.10% 64.00% 71.84%
10 Basic Features+DW+S2V+LR 56.70% 61.41% 60.69% 62.78% 63.29% 57.74% 67.21%
11 Basic Features+DW+S2V+GBDT 61.37% 66.76% 64.11% 69.67% 64.53% 63.48% 71.40%
troducing additional features from aggregated data can con-
sistently improve the performance of the task. For example,
on April 10, the F1 score for “Basic features+GBDT” is
56.80%. Adding the embeddings generated by S2V will im-
prove the baseline by 3.4% while adding the embeddings
by DW will boost the performance by 4.6%. The similar
conclusion can be obtained for the rest of the days.
We can observe that using user node embeddings learned
by DW leads to better results than S2V. Although super-
vised S2V utilizes extra label information, it also suffers
from the issue of unbalanced labels. In this case, experi-
mental results demonstrate that the benefits from the label
information are weaker than the losses suffering from the
label imbalance. Moreover, in the experiments, we further
concatenate the different sources of the learned user node
embeddings together from DW and S2V, but the perfor-
mance is not improved compared with only DW is used.
This suggests the topological information has already been
well extracted by DW.
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Figure 9: Recall scores for the top 1% of the most
suspicious frauds under different detection methods.
In general, the performance of rule-based methods is not
as good as that of classification models. C5.0 has better
than ID3 by 6.9% on average, probably because it takes bet-
ter data discretization and segmentation mechanisms such
as Gain Ratio. LR is implemented with discretization pre-
processing which tremendously improves performance. Only
the best performance of LR is shown in the table, whose
discretization bin size is set as 200. But still, it is obvi-
ous that GBDT can achieve better results than LR, i.e.,
outperforms LR by 4.5%, 2.2%, 4.5% and 4.2% for “Basic
Features”, “Basic Feature+S2V”, “Basic Feature+DW” and
“Basic Features+DW+S2V” on April 16.
Besides F1, recalls at different thresholds are also impor-
tant for real-world analysis. Such recall metric can measure
the ability of the classifier to find the most suspicious fraud.
Figure 9 shows the recall for the top 1% of the most sus-
picious cases, i.e., rec@top 1%, over five different detection
methods. From the results, we can see that IF performs the
worst, i.e., under 10%, which is consistent with F1. Such
results are intuitive as outliers found by IF are probably not
caused by fraud cases but for other reasons. Rule-based ID3
and C5.0 methods achieve much higher results, i.e., 30%
and 40%, respectively. GBDT slightly outperforms LR and
performs the best.
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Figure 10: Time cost over the numbers of machines.
Based on the above observations, we choose DW to ex-
tract additional aggregated information. GBDT is selected
as the classifier for its good performance. In order to decide
the computing resources, we further test time cost versus
the number of machines. For our reimplemented version on
KunPeng, half of the machines are selected as server nodes,
and the rest are used as worker nodes.
As shown in Figure 10, the time cost continues to de-
creases as the number of the machines increases for DW.
However, we also notice that the time cost of GBDT does
not obviously halve when the number of machines increases
to 40 from 20. In fact, in real-world PS environment, IO
and network communication might become the bottleneck
besides computation, while more machines often indicate
greater communication cost due to uneven machine traffic.
Moreover, in the production environment, heterogeneous
tasks execute at the same time, so resource allocation is
necessary to be considered. More resources requested, more
waiting time may be needed for allocation. As a compro-
mise, we finally assign 40 machines for DW and 20 machines
for GBDT.
5.3 Hyperparameter Sensitivity
We further perform a hyperparameter sensitivity analy-
sis, where Dataset 1 shown in Figure 8 is selected for this
experiment.
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Figure 11: Performance versus the dimensions of
the learned user node embeddings.
The dimension size of the learned embeddings is an impor-
tant hyperparameter, which influences the amount of topo-
logical information of the transaction network extracts. As
shown in Figure 11, we compare F1 score against the di-
mension size using different NRL methods. Obviously, 32
is the best dimension size. We believe that the topological
information of the network is not well extracted when the
dimension is too small, while the results probably overfit
when it is too large.
In addition, we vary the tree size to examine the impor-
tance of tree size in GBDT. As illustrated in Figure 12, F1
score consistently improves as the number of trees increases
to 400 and then decreases when the number of trees further
increases to 800. It is intuitive that the model is not suffi-
ciently trained when the number of trees used is too small.
On the contrary, the model prone to overfitting when the
number of trees is too big.
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Figure 12: Performance versus the numbers of
GBDT decision trees.
Table 2: Performance versus the number of node
sampling.
No. of Sampling 25 50 100 200
F1 Score 59.67% 60.62% 61.43% 61.57%
Finally, we analyze the impact of the number of node
sampling in DW, which controls the number of linear node
sequences generated. Similar to the conclusion in [45], the
performance tends to be stable as the number reaches a
specific value. Table 2 suggests that the performance tends
to stabilize when the number reaches 100. Although the
result is slightly better as for 200, it takes about double time
to generate node sequences and learn embeddings. Besides,
the depth of GBDT decision trees is also worthy of exploring,
we omit it here as it can be analyzed in the similar way.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first reveal the significance of online real-
time transaction fraud detection task in Ant Financial and
then demonstrate our feature extraction approaches, detec-
tion models and implementation details. Extensive experi-
ments on real-world data are conducted, showing the effec-
tiveness and performance of our proposed TitAnt system.
In the future, we will investigate more possibilities for sys-
tem design, explore dynamic construction and modeling of
a heterogeneous network, and study the interpretability of
learned embeddings by NRL models.
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